In line with economic theory, carbon ETS determines a rise in marginal cost equal to the carbon opportunity cost regardless of whether carbon allowances are allocated free of charge or not. Hence, common sense would suggest that .rms in imperfectly competitive markets will pass-through into electricity prices only a part of the increase in cost. Instead, by using the load duration curve approach and the dominant .rm with competitive fringe model, the analysis proposed in this paper shows that the result is ambiguous. The increase in price can be either lower or higher than the marginal CO2 cost depending on several structural factors: the degree of market concentration, the available capacity (whether there is excess capacity or not) and the power plant mix in the market; the allowance price and the power demand level (peak vs. off-peak hours). The empirical analysis of the Italian context (an emblematic case of imperfectly competitive market), which can be split in four sub-markets with different structural features, confirms the model predictions. Market power, therefore, can determine a significant deviation from the "full pass-through" rule but we can not know which is the sign of this deviation, a priori, i.e. without before carefully accounting for the structural features of the power market.
On the empirical side, there are not speci…c studies aimed at measuring the impact of market power. Most analyses try to check whether CO 2 costs are fully passed through into electricity prices or not and generically attribute the "deviation" from this "rule" to various factors among which the exercise of market power in the output markets.
In this paper, we speci…cally attempt to assess the impact of market power by using a simple theoretical model and subsequently checking its robustness by means of an empirical analysis.
Concerning the theoretical issues, we have to be aware that results signi…cantly depends on the choice of the competition model 4 .
In the present work we will follow the suggestion of authors who argue in favour of adopting the "auction" approach (von der Harbord, 1993, 1998) . In fact, several electricity spot markets have characteristics which make standard models not well-suited to their analysis. In particular in these markets pricing mechanism is a uniform, …rst price auction.
In addition, to simulate market power in electricity markets we use a dominant …rm facing a competitive fringe model rather than the usual dupolistic-oligopolistic framework. This choice is due to several reasons, either methodological or practical. On the methodological side, the attraction of this characterization is that it avoids the implausible extreme of perfect competition and pure monopoly, at the same time escaping the di¢ culties of characterizing an oligopolistic equilibrium 5 . On the practical side, it is well suited to simulate the structural features of the Italian market which is the empirical case analysed in this paper 6 . 4 In particular, price elasticity choice is very important in simulating the impact of the ETS and can undermine the e¤ectiveness of a model. For example, the existence of Nash equilibria within the Cournot model requires substantial negative price elasticity. This is the case, for example, of the COMPETES model cited above. Whereas completely inelastic demand seems to be more appropriate for the power industry, at least in the short-run. Moreover, Bolle (1992) proves that in this latter case no equilibrium exists in the supply-function model. 5 In particular, this model allows us to overcome the problem of possible inexistent equilibria in pure strategy. In their article on spot market competition in the UK electricity industry, using a typical duopolistic framework, von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) demonstrate that under variable-demands period (i.e. when the range of possible demands exceeds the capacity of the largest generator) there does not exist an equilibruim in pure strategy. Instead, there exist a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 6 Indeed, the dominant …rm-competitive fringe model is useful to represent the reality of several power markets. We especially refer to those markets emerging from restructuring processes where the incumbent
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 focuses on the theoretical analysis. Firstly we will carry out a model which will be used in order to derive the price equilibria and the marginal pass-through rates. We will discuss various possible scenarios depending on the following factors: (1) the leader's share of the total capacity in the market (degree of market concentration); (2) the plant mix operated by either the dominant …rm or the competitive fringe; (3) the allowance price (lower or higher than the so-called "switching price"); (4) the available capacity in the market (whether there is excess capacity or not).
Section 3 sets out the empirical analysis. The Italian power market, an emblematic case of imperfect competition, will be analysed in order to check the robustness of the model predictions. Finally, section 4 summarizes the main results of the article.
Theoretical analysis
2.1. The model: basic assumptions. This subsection describes the structure of the model detailing the main assumptions on the regulation of the electricity and emissions allowance markets.
Concerning power demand, consistently with most contributions on this topic, we assume power demand is inelastic 7 , predictable with certainty and given by a typical load duration curve D = K(H), where H = K 1 (K) is the number of hours (the reference time unit adopted here) in the reference time period (e.g. the year) that demand is equal to or higher than
is the base-load demand (the minimum level) and K H = K(0) is the peak-load demand (the maximum level).
With regard to power supply, we model technologies by means of two distinctive elements: variable costs (essentially, fuel costs) and CO 2 emission rates (emissions per unit of electricity generated).
is obliged to sell a portion of his capacity to di¤erent …rms and new independent producers meet the rise in power demand over time. This is the case of Italy where Enel was obliged to sell 15,000 MW to three di¤erent buyers and now holds around 50% of the total power capacity installed in Italy (including imported power). The wholesale spot market started in 2004 and during the …rst year the power …rms other than Enel behave as a competitive fringe. In fact, their bid prices were very close to marginal cost (or, in some circumstances, nil). 7 The majority of consumers purchase electricity under regulated tari¤s which are independent of the prices negotiated in the wholesale market, at least in the short run. This can justi…es the assumption of price-inelastic demand. See Wolak and Patrick (1997) .
In particular, CO 2 emission rate is e 0 and variable cost of production is v 0 for production levels less than capacity, while production above capacity is impossible (i.e.
in…nitely costly).
Since we simulate a uniform, …rst price auction, it su¢ ces focusing on technologies which have a positive probability of becoming the marginal operating unit. This allows us to neglect, without loss of generality, those technologies suited to meet the base-load demand (i.e. nuclear and large hydropower plants, renewable technologies, cogeneration plants and so on) or which are inelastically supplied.
Given these premises, we restrict the analysis to two groups of plants, a and b, and assume that each group includes a very large number n of homogeneous generating units 8 such that Furthermore, we assume v a < v b and K a + K b = K H , i.e. the units of kind a and b are su¢ cient to meet the peak demand, and consider two scenarios: Scenario 1 in which there is trade-o¤ between variable costs and emission rates (hereafter "trade-o¤ in the plant mix"), i.e. the technology with lower variable cost is the worse polluter (v a < v b and e a > e b , a typical relevant example is given by coal plants (a) versus CCGT -combined cycle gas turbine-technologies (b)); Scenario 2 in which there is not such a trade-o¤, i.e. the technology with lower variable cost is also the cleaner technology (v a < v b but e a < e b , a typical relevant example is given by CCGT plants (a) versus steam cycle plants (b)).
These two scenarios are well suited to represent the Italian market which is the context used for the empirical analysis.
Emission abatement is supposed to be impossible or, equivalently, abatement cost in…nitely costly. This hypothesis is consistent with the time horizon of the analysis (short term analysis of the ETS impact).
Concerning the wholesale market, we assume a typical day ahead market. Before the actual opening of the market (e.g. the day ahead) the generators simultaneously 8 Assuming that each group includes the same number n of units implies that k j depends on K j : This is an arbitrary assumption which does not undermine, however, the signi…cance of the analysis. submit bid prices for each of their units on hourly basis. We neglect the existence of technical constraints such as start-up costs. The auctioneer (generally the so-called market operator) collects and ranks the bids by applying the merit order rule. The bids are ordered by increasing bid prices and form the basis upon which a market supply curve is carried out.
If called upon to supply, generators are paid according to the market-clearing spot price (the system marginal price, equal to the highest bid price accepted). All players are assumed to be risk neutral and to act in order to maximize their expected payo¤ (pro…t). Production costs, emission rates as well as plants'installed capacity are common knowledge.
Given the regulatory framework described above, it is straightforward that price equilibria will depend on the power demand level. Since this latter continuously varies over time, an useful way of representing the price schedule is carrying out the so-called price duration curve p(H) where H is the number of hours in the year that the power price is equal to or higher than p.
With regard to the allowance market, we suppose this market is very large (consistently with the extent of the European ETS) and that …rms are price takers. Therefore, the allowance price, p tp , is given exogenously. Carbon emissions allowances are allocated free of charge and on the basis of the amounts emitted in a base period, generally a year in the past (typical grandfathering) or the present year or on the basis of the expected emissions in the future 9 .
Finally, we assume that …rm's o¤er prices are constrained to be below some threshold level, b p; which can be interpreted in several ways.
It may be a (regulated) maximum price, p, as o¢ cially introduced by the regulator or we can suppose that it is not introduced o¢ cially but simply perceived by the generators, i.e. …rms believe that the regulator will introduce price regulation if the price rises above the threshold. This latter interpretation is well-suited to the topic analysed here. In fact, …rms might decide to bring bid prices down not only to avoid regulation in the wholesale electricity market but also to avoid a change in the allowance allocation method, e.g.
from freely allocation to auctioning 10 . For these reasons we think that it is acceptable assuming the price cap is insensitive to the CO 2 price. In brief, we will consider two scenarios (Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, with and without "trade-o¤ in the plant mix", respectively) and, for each of them, two cases of available capacity in the market, excess capacity (K c = K c ) and scarcity of generation capacity
2.2. Price duration curves. In order to derive price equilibria in the form of price duration curves, we have to start from how the ETS impacts on marginal production costs. Given that an emission allowance represents an opportunity cost, the marginal cost of production is expected to include the full carbon opportunity cost, regardless of whether allowances are allocated free of charge or not. Formally,
where M C i j is the marginal cost of the i-th unit belonging to the group j of plants and p tp e i j is the corresponding carbon opportunity cost. Given equation (1) and for the purpose of this analysis, the generating units belonging to the group j of plants are the most (least) e¢ cient units if their marginal cost (including the carbon opportunity cost) is lower (higher) than that of the units belonging to the other group i.
power …rms, argues that "there is no scope to remove windfall pro…ts from the EU-ETS, only redistribute them, so e¤orts should be focused on bringing the electricity price down".
Furthermore, looking at the Scenario 1 ("trade-o¤ in the plant mix"), there exists an allowance price, the "switching price" Finally, the marginal carbon opportunity cost is the price of the CO 2 emissions allowance multiplied by the emission rate of the marginal production unit.
Given these de…nitions, the change (due to the ETS) in marginal production cost of the marginal unit is given by
Notice that M C is equal to the impact of the ETS under perfect competition. In this case, in fact, prices equal the marginal cost of the marginal unit regardless of the power demand level.
We are now able to simulate the impact of market power on power pricing. For this purpose, as previously pointed out, we adopt a dominant …rm facing a competitive fringe model. The general formulation of the model assumes that the dominant …rm owns and operates z 2 [0; 2n] units of both group a and b while the remaining units are operated by 2n z …rms behaving as a competitive fringe. Obviously, z = 0 corresponds to the case of pure competition while z = 2n to that of pure monopoly.
In order to derive the price schedule in the form of a price duration curve, we introduce the following parameters.
The …rst parameter is 2 [0; 1] representing the share of the total power capacity in the market operated by the dominant …rm. Complementary, the competitive fringe Figure By facing the competitive fringe, the dominant …rm has two alternative strategies: (1) bidding the price threshold (b p) so accommodating the maximum production by the fringe or (2) competing à la Bertrand with the rivals in order to maximize his market share.
Let K f be the installed capacity in most e¢ cient plants operated by the competitive fringe. Thus
Similarly, let K = K H K d be the peak demand minus the dominant …rm's capacity It is important to note that determines not only the degree of market concentration but also the total share of most e¢ cient plants in the market, K. In particular, increasing 
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, two possible price duration curves are possible depending on whether the discontinuity is at e
The following Proposition identi…es the critical value of which discriminates between these two cases.
Proposition 1. Under market power, there exists
where:
By di¤erentiating e K and e e K with respect to d , f , we …nd that the degree of market power (which decreases in b K) is an increasing function of f , when > , and a decreasing function of d , when < (see the Appendix):
Understanding how market power depends on the allowance price (i.e. how the ETS impacts on market power) is a little bit more complex. The following corollary describes this kind of correlation under low allowance prices 11 (the most relevant case for the empirical analysis of this paper).
Corollary 1.
Under low allowance prices, the ETS determines an increase in market
, where: e = e c and v = v c , under excess capacity; e = 0 and v = p, without excess capacity.
Proof.
For the formal proof, see the Appendix. Intuitively, the ETS can increase market power when the change in the cost structure between the technologies makes more pro…table bidding the price threshold rather than the marginal cost of the least e¢ cient plants, i.e. when (e e a )=(v v a ) > (e b e a )=(v b v a ). This condition always (never) is satis…ed if "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" combines with excess capacity (without both "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" and excess capacity). Otherwise, it is satis…ed only under certain values of v j and e j .
Marginal pass-through rate.
Since we intend to consider the overall change in marginal prices due the ETS, an useful way of proceeding is evaluating the marginal pass-through rate de…ned as follows. Notice that the MPTR is always equal to 1 under perfect competition. In this case, in fact, prices equal the marginal cost of the marginal unit regardless of the power demand level. 
In order to carry out the MPTR curve (i.e. how the MPTR is distributed over time), we have to depict the price and marginal cost (of the marginal unit) duration curves before and after the ETS distinguishing between low (0 < p
allowance prices (only for the Scenario 1). Table 1 shows the di¤erent expressions of
, f corresponding to the situations after and before the ETS. We will use the superscript star (*) in order to address the critical threshold of K, H, and
the situation after the ETS).
In what follows, we will present some relevant examples of marginal pass-through rate curves corresponding to di¤erent scenarios in terms of available capacity, market concentration and plant mix. For the sake of simplicity, we will illustrate only the outcome under low allowance prices while that under high allowance prices is reported in the Appendix. by the change in marginal production cost of the marginal unit 12 . For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the dominant …rm and the competitive fringe operate the same share of most e¢ cient plants
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the MPTR curves obtained by deviding the change in prices
Figures clearly show that results largely depends on the power demand level (peak vs.
o¤-peak hours) and the available capacity in the market.
In the peak hours, there would not be any CO 2 cost pass-through under scarcity of generation capacity (provided that is enough high) whereas, under excess capacity, the MPTR would be more than 1.
In the o¤-peak hours power prices can include the full marginal carbon cost but even much less if the share of most polluting plant in the market is enough high 13 . This is more likely to occur under excess capacity than under scarcity of generation capacity. Therefore, the following con…gurations have to be analysed:
under scarcity of generation capacity.
In the peak hours (…gs. 4 and 5), the results are similar to those emerging from the Scenario 1 (MPTR more than 1, under excess capacity, and less than 1, under scarcity of generation capacity).
In the o¤-peak hours, instead, the outcome is substantially di¤erent. This time power prices fully include the marginal carbon opportunity (and even much more in the midmerit hours), regardless of the share of most (least) polluting plants in the market.
Empirical analysis
With regard to the impact of the ETS on power prices, the empirical literature provides a controversial framework. Some authors argue in favour of a full (or almost full) passthrough 14 . Others …nd that the CO 2 costs seem to have not (yet) been fully passed into power prices 15 or that there is limited evidence that CO 2 is factored in wholesale price 16 .
This controversial framework arises even though authors analyse the same set of markets.
Therefore, we are not able to check the robustness of our model on the basis of the current literature, not only because of the (signi…cant) disparities in (and possible limits of) the methodologies and the uncertainty and immaturity of the CO 2 market but also because these studies do not focus on the problem of measuring the e¤ect of market power.
Thus, the need of carrying out a speci…c empirical analysis arises.
For this purpose, we examine the Italian context which is a highly concentrated market where Enel, the dominant …rm (holding around 50% of the total power capacity in the market) is able to exert a high degree of market power. Furthermore, this context is interesting for another reason. Because of the features of the electricity transport grid, 1 4 For instance, by analyzing the spark spread (the di¤erence between the power price and the cost of gas to produce a MWh of electricity) in Germany, the Netherland and United Kingdom, Newbery the Italian wholesale power market can be split into four sub-markets (North, macroSouth, macro-Sicilia and Sardegna). Source: our estimations and AEEG (2005) (1) including imported power Table 2 shows the main structural features of these sub-markets in terms of maximum power demand, available capacity and market concentration. As can be noted, Sardegna and macro-Sicilia sub-markets are tyipical duopolies (Sardegna more than macro-Sicilia)
whereas the North and macro-South sub-markets are well-suited to be described by a dominant …rm facing a competitive fringe model. In addition, in the North of Italy the degree of market concentration is relatively low and there is excess of generation capacity whereas in the South the degree of market concentration is very high and there are problems of scarcity of generation capacity 17 . Analysing separately these sub-markets, therefore, might allow us to check the robustness of the theoretical analysis with respect to the combined e¤ect of the di¤erent structural factors of the power market.
In the emprical literature generally two approach are used in order to estimate the rates of passing through CO 2 opportunity costs 18 . One approach, the most used, relies on the forward markets. The pass-through rates are estimated by assessing the extent to which changes in forward power prices can be explained by changes in underlying 1 7 Generally, security of supply needs a reserve margin in peaking technologies around 5-10% of the total installed capacity. Conventionally, above (below) this threshold we face excess capacity (scarcity of capacity). Since this is very unlikely to occur, the time series approach (without appropriate and complicated elaborations) may lead to incorrect interpretation. Consequently, it seems more appropriate (and simple) reasoning in terms of load duration curves instead of time series, i.e. directly comparing prices corresponding to similar levels of power demand in di¤erent years. This approach, moreover, is consistent with the theoretical analysis presented above. Source: Italian Market Operator (GME) and our estimates Furthermore, since the Italian market is the combination of (almost) separated submarkets (with di¤erent features in terms of market power and available capacity), the analysis of this market as a whole might be misleading 21 . To avoid this problem, it is better analysing each sub-market separately, focusing on the North and the macro-South sub-markets, for the reasons already explained.
The approach consists of the following steps. Firstly, it is necessary to carry out the load duration curve and the corresponding price, fuel cost and CO 2 cost curves, by ordering power prices, fuel cost and CO 2 cost by decreasing level of demand. Secondly, the spread curve, obtained by subtracting the fuel cost curve from the price curve, is compared to the CO 2 cost curve.
The fuel and CO 2 costs 22 are calculated by accounting for the real plant mix in each sub-market (tab. 3), i.e. by estimating which kind of technology is able to set prices in 2 1 For example, since the national price (PUN) is the zonal (sub-market) weighted average price, we might …nd a full pass-through which might be the combination of a marginal pass-through rate higher than 1 in a sub-market and lower than 1 in another sub-market, i.e. a situation in which the overall result is due to a trade-o¤ between complementary regional results. 2 In the South of Italy, where there is not excess capacity and the degree of market concentration is high, power …rms should not pass through any CO 2 cost in a large number of peak hours whereas the MPTR should be sensibly more than 1 in the mid-merit hours before converging to 1 in the (very) o¤-peak hours.
viding combined heat and power generation. The overall e¢ ciency (heat plus power devided by the fuel consumption) of these plants is around 70-80%. Their marginal cost of power production is generally calculated by sharing the total cost between power and heat, on the basis of the energy or the exergy content (or by subtracting the revenue from heat from the total cost). Thus the marginal cost of power production is lower than that of the simple CCGT. With regard to the CO 2 cost the procedure is quite di¤erent. In fact, the public authority allocates the allowances on the basis of the total CO 2 emissions without sharing between power and heat. Since the amount of emissions from CHP-CCGT plants is larger than that from a simple CCGT, the CO 2 cost (per unit of electricity) will be signi…cantly higher. 2 4 The variable cost of hydro plants is virtually zero. However, because of the scarcity of the water supplies a shadow price, which can be viewed as variable cost, arises. In fact, generating one megawatthour in a given hour implies not being able to generate one megawatt-hour in some future hour, so determining an opportunity cost. As can be noted, in both macro-South and North sub-markets the change in spread is almost everywhere negative, legitimating us to say that it is unlikely that power prices included the CO 2 cost in 2005. This result may be explained by the fact that in Italy the CO 2 emission allowances have been allocated only at the beginning of 2006. Consequently, it is presumable that power …rms began to pass through the CO 2 cost only in that year,
i.e. they decided to do not pass through the CO 2 cost during 2005 (before the allocation) also (perhaps) in order to avoid more restrictive regulation (allowance under-allocation).
The empirical analysis supports this latter hypothesis providing a framework con…rm-ing the model predictions. In the North sub-market (…g. remaining hours the change in spread is more or less equal to the CO 2 cost for the CCGT and for CHP-CCGT. The shape of the MPTR curve, therefore, is enough similar to that predicted by the model (…g. 10), except for the interval between 2200 and 4000 hours (between 25% and 45% on pecentage basis). In this range, in fact, the model seems to overestimate the pass-through rate 25 .
In the South of the country, the change in spread (…g. 11) is much lower than the 
Conclusions
In line with economic theory, carbon ETS is expected to determine a rise in marginal cost equal to the carbon opportunity cost regardless of whether carbon allowances are allocated 2 5 A partial explaination of this di¤erence might be that in imperfectly competitive market strategic …rms …nd it optimal to move hydro production from hours with high demand to those with lower demand (Bushnell, 2002) . Looking at our speci…c case, this implies that, in a certain range of peak hours (presumably those with lower demand), the increase in prices due to ETS under imperfect competition might equal the CO 2 cost for CCGT whereas, under perfect competition, this increase would equal the CO 2 cost for gas-…red steam cycle plants. Consequetly, the MPTR might be signi…cantly less than 1. Instead, the theoretical analysis carried out in this paper shows that the result is ambiguous. The increase in price can be, in fact, either lower or higher than the marginal CO 2 cost depending on several factors: (1) the degree of market concentration, (2) the plant mix operated by either the dominant …rm or the competitive fringe, (3) the price of the CO 2 emissions allowances; (4) the available capacity in the market (whether there is excess capacity or not). Furthermore the outcome substantially depends on the power demand level, i.e. if we look at the peak or o¤-peak hours.
In the peak hours, the marginal pass-through rate (MPTR) is certainly less than 1 under scarcity of generation capacity whereas, under excess capacity, power prices include the full marginal carbon opportunity cost (and even more).
In the o¤-peak hours the MPTR may be less than 1 only when there is "trade-o¤ in By analysing separately these two sub-markets, we …nd results con…rming the model predictions. In particular, in the North sub-market power prices include more than the marginal CO 2 cost in a relatively limited number of peak hours (up to the dominant …rm prefers to use his relatively low market power). In the o¤-peak hours, the MPTR is equal to 1 (or just below). In the macro-South sub-market, the marginal pass-through rate is much lower than 1 (and even nil) for almost all the peak hours whereas power prices include much more than the CO 2 cost in o¤-peak hours (converging to the CO 2 cost in the very o¤-peak hours).
An overall picture, therefore, which seems to support the model simulations and suggests the following consideration. Market power can really determines a deviation from the "full pass-through" rule but we can not know which is the sign of this deviation, a priori, i.e. without before carefully taking into account the structural features of the power market.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is immediately intuitive that when K K the system marginal price equals p (for
Bertrand equilibria (…rst marginal cost pricing) arise and prices equals the marginal cost of the most e¢ cient plants (M C). In fact, on the one hand, whenever the demand is so high that both leader's and fringe's least e¢ cient units can enter the market, the dominant …rm would not gain any advantage by competing à la Bertrand, i.e. by attempting to undercut the rivals. Therefore, he will maximize his pro…t by bidding the price threshold 27 . On the other hand, whenever the power demand is lower than the fringe's power capacity in most e¢ cient plants, competing à la Bertrand is the only leader's available strategy in order to have a positive probability of being dispatched. In consequence prices will converge to the marginal cost of the most e¢ cient plants.
It remains to identify the leader's optimal choice on K 2 2 be the pro…ts corresponding to the …rst and second strategies above, 2 7 Strictly speaking, only o¤er prices of units that may become the marginal units (i.e. units belonging to the group b) need equal the price cap or the backstop price. 2 8 Note that assuming a dominant …rm with competitive fringe model, rather than an oligopolistic framework, assures that equilibria in pure-strategy do exist. For an explanation of why equilibria in pure strategies do not exist in the case of oligopolistic competition, see von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). 2 9 Strictly speaking, bidding M C for units of kind b and p M C (where ' 0 + ) for units of kind a. Similarly suppose e e K < K. From (A8)
Given that
and from (A7) e K < K. Thus, e K = 2 K; K :
In addition, from (A7) and (A8), if e K = K then e e K = K and vice versa.
Finally, note that e K < K and e e K > K f .
Last some comparative statics,
In fact, when > ; increasing fringe's share of most e¢ cient plants implies that bidding the marginal cost of the least e¢ cient plants becomes less pro…table for the dominant …rm compared to bidding the price cap or the backstop price ( 
2 K H > 0
Thus, market power is a decreasing function of .
Proof of Proposition 1.
This proposition follows directly from Lemma 1. Since e K and ẽ K never work together and provided that when e K = K then e e K = K (see the proof of Lemma 1 above); in order to identify the critical value of it su¢ ces carrying out the locus of points of ( e ) that e K = K which is equal to the locus of points of ( e e ) that e e K = K e = e e = =
Furthermore, note that e K < K and e e K > K f . This condition always (never) is satis…ed when "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" combines with excess capacity (without both "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" and excess capacity).
Since e K and e e K are increasing functions of (see comparative statics in proof of Lemma 1 above), market power surely increases (decreases) in p tp when "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" combines with excess capacity (without both "trade-o¤ in the plant mix" and excess capacity). Otherwise, the ETS can determine either a rise or a decrease in market power depending on the relative values of variable costs and emission rates of the di¤erent kinds of technologies.
High allowance prices.
For the sake of simplicity, we report only examples referring to the Scenario 1. Figures 13 and 14 refer to an allowance price around 43 e/tonCO 2 , just above the "switching price" between coal and CCGT plants. As can be noted, the outcome is very similar to that under low allowance prices (see subsection 2.3.) 30 . This time, however, it is more likely that the MPTR could be less than 1 in the o¤-peak hours.
3 0 As pointed out in note 11, explaining how the ETS can impact on market power under high allowance prices is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is possible to demontsrate that b K > b K if the allowance price is not very high (even if above the "switching price). This is the case simulated in …gs A1 and A2. Table 4 reports variable costs, emission rates and energy e¢ ciencies of power generating technologies adopted throughout the paper. (1) Including heat (i.e. useful heat plus power divided by fuel consumption)
